

# 24.09 Minds and Machines

## Fall 11 HASS-D CI

Tye on Q(q)ualia

(we'll postpone Nagel  
until after Jackson)




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# Tye on qualia

**q**ualia are ‘the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it’s like to have them’

‘in this standard, broad sense of the term, it is hard to deny that there are qualia’

# qualia and intentionality

intentionality/representation      no intentionality

qualia/  
phenomenology/  
sensational  
properties

perception (at least)

sensations, e.g. pain [??]

no qualia

at least some  
propositional attitudes,  
e.g. belief [?]

‘unconscious’ sensations  
[??]

# Tye on Qualia

the table suggests that intentionality and qualia are two independent dimensions of the mental

but Tye thinks this is wrong

**Qualia** are the introspectively accessible nonrepresentational (or nonintentional) properties of experiences that characterize what it's like to have them

**Qualia** 'are a philosophical myth'

# representational properties and Qualia

perceptual (in particular, visual) experiences have representational properties (e.g. the property of representing the perceiver's environment as containing a blue cube)

so visual experiences have intentionality

visual experiences also have **q**ualia

they have **Q**ualia just in case:

two visual experiences can be alike in representational properties but differ in qualia

but: 'I know of no such counterexample'




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# warning

many of the examples Tye considers (e.g. example I below, and those in ‘the argument from hallucination’ and ‘twin earth’ sections) do not even purport to be cases of two experiences alike in representational content which differ in qualia

so the relation of these examples to the existence of Qualia is somewhat indirect




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# illusions and intentionality

the intentionality of visual experiences (that is, the fact that they have representational properties) can be illustrated and motivated by visual illusions

someone has a visual illusion iff the world is not as her visual experience represents it as being

compare: someone has a false belief iff the world is not as her belief represents it as being

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# a lightness illusion




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Anderson, *Nature* 3 march 2005



# the 'moons' are identical




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# the 'moons' rotated




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# example 1: the ocean



## example 2: monocular vs. binocular vision

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A furnished room.

‘Suppose you look at an array of pieces of furniture with one eye closed...Imagine now you look at the same scene with both eyes. The experience is different. [sensationally but not representationally]’ (Peacocke, p. 439; in Readings)

‘When I view the situation with both eyes, I see a little more at the periphery of my visual field...An appeal to Qualia is not required’

## example 3: the Necker cube




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‘there seems to be some additional level of classification at which the successive experiences fall under the same type... We have here another example of apparently nonrepresentational similarities between experiences’ (Peacocke, p. 440)

‘before and after the ‘aspect’ switch, the experience represents the cube as having various unchanging spatial properties relative to the given point of view’

## example 4: the inverted spectrum



how the scene looks to us



how the scene looks to Tom, a victim of 'spectrum inversion'

# an argument for Qualia



1. since Tom has been 'spectrally inverted' from birth, his experience when viewing a red pepper is of 'the sort that is usually produced in him when viewing red objects and that usually leads him to believe that a red object is present'
2. 'so he, like you and me, in viewing the [pepper] has an experience that represents the [pepper] as red'
3. so Tom's experience and your experience of the pepper have the same representational properties but differ in qualia
4. hence: there are Qualia

# exercise

what's wrong, if anything, with Tye's response to the inverted spectrum argument?





# next session

read Jackson

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