Speaking is acting. Acting in general has a nested structure. I flip the switch, thereby turning on the light, thereby alerting a prowler thereby ....

Likewise I utter certain words, with certain semantic properties thereby (the locutionary act), thereby betting Connecticut will win the game (the illocutionary act), thereby causing the bookie to make an inscription in her book (the, or a, perlocutionary act).... I say certain words, thereby renouncing allegiance to foreign princes and potentates, thereby becoming an American citizen.... This is intuitive but we need tests, a classification scheme, a theory.

Rough test for illocutionary vs perlocutionary. I perform the illocutionary act *IN* speaking those words. I perform the perlocutionary act *BY* speaking them. Also the illocutionary act is much more conventionalized and rule-governed in most cases; the perlocutionary act is more part of the world's natural, causal order.   Also illocutionary acts tend to be governed by Grice-style reflexive intentions; I inform you of BLAH by getting you to recognize my intention to do so.   But this is not always enough; I can't plead guilty unless I'm on trial etc, however much I mean to do so and however you see that I do.

Rough initial taxonomy of illocutionary acts.
<u>Constatives</u>: announcing, answering, claiming, concurring, conjecturing, denying, reporting, stating
<u>Directives</u>: advising, admonishing, asking, begging, excusing, forbidding, instructing, suggesting, urging, warning
<u>Commissives</u>: agreeing, guaranteeing, inviting, offering, promising, swearing, volunteering
<u>Behabitives/Expressives</u>: apologizing, condoling, congratulating, greeting, thanking

Austin tends to assume you've got a distinct illocutionary act for each illocutionary verb. Searle tries for an independent characterization of each act-type. He wants to give "... a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of illocutionary act, and extracting from it a set of semantical rules for the use of the expression (or syntactic device) which marks the utterance as an illocutionary force."

R**egulative rules:** control antecedently existing forms of behavior; activity is logically independent of the rules; "If Y, do X". **Constitutive rules:** do not merely regulate but define or create new forms of behavior; activity is defined in terms of the rules; "X counts as Y".   So, P is a device for promising iff

Propositional Content Rule: P is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker
Preparatory Rule: P is to be uttered only if the hearer would prefer that the speaker do A than not do it, and it is not obvious to both of them that the speaker will do A in the normal course of events.
Sincerity Rule: P is to be uttered only if the speaker intends to do A.
Essential Rule: The utterance of *P* counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.

Ten dimensions of variation
Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act —— asserting vs asking
Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world —— asserting vs ordering
Differences in expressed psychological states — asserting vs deploring
Differences in strength with which the illocutionary point is presented – suggesting vs insisting
Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer – requesting vs ordering
Differences in the way the utterance relates to the parties' interests – promising vs threatening
Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse —— concluding vs supposing
Differences in propositional content —— asserting vs recounting vs predicting
Differences between acts that must always be speech acts .... —— declaring vs warning
Differences between acts that require extra-linguistic institutions... ——christening vs warning

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