

XVII PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES: FREGE & DAVIDSON

Frege's account

Words in the complement sentence of a propositional attitude report refer to what is customarily their sense.

Worries for Frege

What happens to iterated reports?

What happens to anaphoric dependence and quantification into or out of propositional attitude reports?

Are there such things as senses to do the job? In particular, the more we are pushed towards idiolects, the more problematic the various anaphoric relations become.

How do we make the substitutions that we regularly make, e.g. replacing indexicals with names or other indexicals?

Davidson's Paratactic Analysis

- (1) Galileo said that the Earth moves.
- (2) Galileo said that. The Earth moves.
- (3) $\exists x$ (Galileo's utterance x and my next utterance make us samesayers). The Earth moves.

Some nice (?) features:

No need for Fregean senses, propositions or the like.

Words in the complement perform their standard roles.

Words in the complement are used not mentioned.

We can keep to the surface grammar (?)

Worries for Davidson

Is the complement 'that' really a demonstrative (notwithstanding the *OED* passage); what of other languages?

Claims about sentences that would have been uttered.

Claims about never uttered sentences (Kripke) 'No one's ever said that aardvarks make good attorneys'

The counting problem (McFetridge):

The Earth moves.

Galileo said that.

The Earth moves.

That's another thing Galileo said.

How innocent is the *samesaying* relation?

Can we generalize to belief and other propositional attitude reports?