

IX KRIPKE ON DONNELLAN

What exactly is Donnellan claiming?

Is he saying that there is a semantic or syntactic ambiguity? (And what does he mean by the latter? He seems to have in mind structural ambiguity.) He says that he is not. But if not, what is the distinction between referential and attributive uses supposed to be? Is the claim that a simple referential use in which the description fails to denote can nonetheless be *true*?

A bundle of distinctions

- (i) De re/de dicto
- (ii) Wide/narrow scope (and intermediate: 'Hoover believed that the Berrigans plotted to kidnap a high American official')
- (iii) rigid/non rigid descriptions (cf. *dthat*; indefinite *this* "I came home and there was this man on the doorstep")

The Gricean Framework

The distinction between what is said, and what the speaker thereby manages to communicate.
Speaker's meaning and semantic meaning
Speaker's reference and semantic reference.

Five Artificial Languages

Weak Russell Language
Intermediate Russell Language
Strong Russell Language

Unambiguous D-language
Ambiguous D-language

Methodological Conclusions

There is no need to claim that English is like an unambiguous D-language, since:

- (i) the phenomena adduced arise even if it like a weak or intermediate Russell language;
- (ii) the phenomena arise for names, for which no ambiguity thesis is forthcoming

Ambiguity postulation as the lazy approach; tests for ambiguity.
Could English actually be indeterminate?
The anaphoric test.