

Williamson, *Vagueness**

1. What is the sorites paradox? (Chapter 1.) Outline the supervenience solution. (Chapter 5.)
2. Against supervenience Williamson says: ‘Once the supposed advantages of supertruth are seen to be illusory, it becomes overwhelmingly plausible to equate ordinary truth with the property that meets Tarski’s disquotational condition, truth_T .’ (164). What does he mean? Do his arguments against supervenience work?
3. ‘Is nihilism tenable? Is it compelling?’ (165)
4. ‘Can the denial of bivalence—a not uncommon move in philosophy—really be reduced to absurdity as easily as that?’ (192)
5. Is vagueness ignorance?

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* Williamson is more than enough for one session, so let’s leave the Graff as optional reading (if you’ve read it, feel free to bring it up).

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