

Quine, 'Epistemology naturalized', and Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, ch. VI.

1. According to Quine, there has been progress on 'the conceptual side of epistemology.' What does he mean? Has there?
2. Is the Human predicament the Humean predicament? Quine identifies two 'cardinal tenets of empiricism' and claims that they are 'unassailable.' Are they?
3. Unpack the argument for the indeterminacy of translation on p. 80.
4. Should epistemology be pursued as 'a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science'?
5. According to Stroud, the 'traditional Cartesian examination' of our putative knowledge of the external world makes skepticism irresistible. Going by the opening pages of chapter VI and other remarks throughout that chapter, what is his argument?
6. 'Quine's naturalistic study of knowledge proceeds in terms of a general distinction between what we get through the senses and everything we believe about the physical world on the basis of those data. I would now like to argue that that conception of knowledge and of the epistemological task not only tolerates scepticism, as I have just been suggesting, but is actually committed to it. It would make it impossible for us to understand, even on its own terms, how our knowledge of the external world in general is possible' (234). Explain and evaluate Stroud's argument.

Stroud, Barry. "Naturalized Epistemology." Chapter 6 in *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*. Oxford University Press, 1984. © Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see <https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/>.




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