

## Briggs 'Distorted Reflection'

1. Are there informal, intuitive motivations for Reflection, or something like it?
2. On p.66 Briggs attributes to Christensen the view that "Sets of beliefs (or pairs of credence functions) held at different times are not the sorts of things that ought to be coherent." Why might Christensen think this? What is Briggs's response? Who is right?
3. Explain as best you can what Briggs's Qualified Reflection says and why Briggs thinks it's correct.
4. Briggs's Qualified Reflection (and Distorted Reflection) require the assumption that "the agent's possible evidence propositions—that is, the propositions that might represent the totality of what the agent learns between  $t_0$  and  $t_1$ —form a partition  $\{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n\}$ ." (p.69) (This means that *necessarily, one and only one of member of  $\{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n\}$  is true*). Is this a realistic assumption? Can there be cases where this does not hold? What should we say about such cases if they exist?
5. I'm a gun owner who wants to (rationally) believe G: that gun control laws are not very effective at reducing violent crime. I'm told that there are some studies suggesting G and some suggesting not-G, but I'm not familiar with any of them. I plan to read all and only those studies *supporting* G. Since these studies do in fact support G I predict that I will *rationally* come to have more confidence in G. What should we make of this? What might Briggs say about it?
6. What is the suppositional test that Briggs reads Moore as proposing? How does she apply it to the Diachronic Dutch-Book arguments for Conditionalization and Reflection?

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