



REVENUE MANAGEMENT

An Introduction to Linear Optimization

15.071x – The Analytics Edge

Airline Regulation (1938-1978)



- The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) set fares, routes, and schedules for all interstate air transport
- Most major airlines favored this system due to guaranteed profits
- Led to inefficiency and higher costs
 - Applications for new routes and fares often delayed or dismissed

Airline Deregulation (1978)

- The administration of President Jimmy Carter passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978
- The Act encouraged
 - **More competition:** 52 new airlines between 1980 and 2000
 - **New air routes:** saved passengers an estimated \$10.3 billion each year in travel time
 - **Lower fares:** ticket prices are 40% lower today than they were in 1978
- This led to **more passengers**
 - The number of air passengers increased from 207.5 million in 1974 to 721.1 million in 2010

A Competitive Edge



- More competition led to heavy losses by air carriers
 - Need to lower fares while meeting operating costs
- 9 major carriers and more than 100 smaller airlines went bankrupt between 1978 and 2002
- How did airlines compete?

Discount Fares



- On January 17, 1985 American Airlines (AA) launched its Ultimate Super Saver fares to compete with PeopleExpress
- Need to fill at least a minimum number of seats without selling every seat at discount prices
 - Sell enough seats to cover fixed operating costs
 - Sell remaining seats at higher rates to maximize revenues/profits

How Many Seats to Sell on Discount?




- Passengers have different valuations
 - Business people value flexibility (last-minute/refundable)
 - People seeking getaways value good deals (early birds)
- Sell too many discounted seats
 - Not enough seats for high-paying passengers
- Sell too few discounted seats
 - Empty seats at takeoff implying lost revenue
- How should AA allocate its seats among customers to maximize its revenue?


Let's Start Simple




Ticket Prices

American Airlines 

Lowest Fare from \$238

| Flights | Departure | Arrival | Choice |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|---|
|  3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 12:00 pm JFK | 03:10 pm LAX | <input type="radio"/> \$238 2 Seats left |

Lowest Fare from \$617


| Flights | Departure | Arrival | Choice |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
|  3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 12:00 pm JFK | 02:55 pm LAX | <input type="radio"/> \$617 |

Early Bird

Last minute

Boeing 757-200 Seat Map

- 166 Economy seats



Demand Forecasting



- Demand for different prices can be forecasted using analytics tools, looking at historical data and incorporating models of human behavior
 - Time series methods
 - Linear regression
- Forecasts could be erroneous
 - Need to assess sensitivity to forecast errors
- We'll assume that demand has been forecasted

Myopic Solution

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 50 | 50 | Capacity 166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | 116 | |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?

Myopic Solution

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | 100 | Capacity 166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | 66 | |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?

Myopic Solution

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 200 | 166 | Capacity 166 |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | 0 | |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?
- This seems simple, but what if we had 100 different flights?
- In the next video, we'll see how to formulate this mathematically

Single Route Example

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |

Capacity
166

- Problem: Find the optimal number of discounted seats and regular seats to sell to maximize revenue
- Let's formulate the problem mathematically

Step 1. Decisions

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |

Capacity
166

- What are our decisions?
 - Number of regular seats to sell – R
 - Number of discount seats to sell – D

Step 2. Objective

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |


Capacity
166

- What is our objective?
 - Maximizing total airline revenue
 - Revenue from each type of seat is equal to the number of that type of seat sold times the seat price

$$\text{max } 617 * R + 238 * D$$

Step 3. Constraints

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |


Capacity
166

- AA cannot sell more seats than the aircraft capacity
 - Total number of seats sold cannot exceed capacity

$$R + D \leq 166$$

- AA cannot sell more seats than the demand
 - Regular seats sold cannot exceed 100 $R \leq 100$
 - Discount seats sold cannot exceed 150 $D \leq 150$

Step 4. Non-Negativity

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |

Capacity
166


- AA cannot sell a negative number of seats

$$R \geq 0 \quad D \geq 0$$

Problem Formulation

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |

Capacity
166



- Maximize Total airline revenue
- Subject to
- Seats sold cannot exceed capacity
 - Seats sold cannot exceed demand
 - Seats sold cannot be negative


Problem Formulation

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|
| JFK | Regular | 617 | 100 | |
| LAX | Discount | 238 | 150 | |

Capacity
166


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximize} \quad & 617R + 238D \\ \text{Subject to} \quad & R + D \leq 166 \\ & R \leq 100, D \leq 150 \\ & R \geq 0, D \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
 - Non-negativity
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$

Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
 - Non-negativity
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$
 - Capacity
 $R + D \leq 166$

Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
 - Non-negativity
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$
 - Capacity
 $R + D \leq 166$
 - Demand
 $R \leq 100, D \leq 150$

Visualizing the Problem




- 2D Representation
- Constraints
 - Non-negativity
 $R \geq 0, D \geq 0$
 - Capacity
 $R + D \leq 166$
 - Demand
 $R \leq 100, D \leq 150$

Feasible Space




Possible Solutions



- Revenue
 $617R + 238D$
- How many seats to sell of each type to achieve a revenue of
 - \$20,000?
 - \$40,000?
 - \$60,000?

Best Solution




- Revenue $617R + 238D$
- How many seats to sell of each type to achieve the highest revenue possible?

Marketing Decisions

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to invest in marketing its fares
- AA forecasts that its marketing effort is likely to attract one more unit of demand per **\$200 spent**


| | Marketing Cost/unit | Marginal Revenue |
|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Discount Fare | \$200 | |
| Regular Fare | \$200 | |

Marketing Discount Fares




- What if AA increases its marketing budget for discount fares
- Higher demand for discount class
 - 150
 - 175
 - 200

Marketing Discount Fares




- What if AA decreases its budget to market discount fares?
- Lower demand for discount fare without affecting revenue

Marketing Discount Fares




- “Shadow Price”
 - Marginal revenue of increasing discount demand by 1 unit
 - **ZERO** for discount demand greater than 66

Marketing Regular Fares



- AA is considering increasing its budget to market regular fares
- Higher demand for regular class
 - 100
 - 125
 - 150

Marketing Regular Fares



- “Shadow Price”
- Marginal revenue for unit increase in demand of regular seats
- **\$379** for regular demand between 0 and 166

Marketing Decisions

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to invest in marketing its fares
- AA forecasts that its marketing effort is likely to attract one more unit of demand per **\$200 spent**


| | Marketing Cost/unit | Marginal Revenue |
|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Discount Fare | \$200 | 0 |
| Regular Fare | \$200 | \$379 |

Capacity Allocation

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to allocate a bigger aircraft for the 6 hour JFK-LAX leg

| | Cost/hr | Total Cost | Seats | Revenue |
|-------------------|----------|------------|-------|----------|
| Original Aircraft | \$12,067 | \$72,402 | 166 | \$77,408 |
| Boeing 757-200 | \$12,765 | \$76,590 | 176 | |
| Boeing 767-300 | \$14,557 | \$87,342 | 218 | |

Aircraft Capacity



- AA is considering increasing its aircraft capacity
 - 166
 - 176
 - 218

Capacity Allocation

- Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to allocate a bigger aircraft for the 6 hour JFK-LAX leg

| | Total Cost | Revenue | Profit |
|-------------------|------------|----------|---------|
| Original Aircraft | \$72,402 | \$77,408 | \$5,006 |
| Boeing 757-200 | \$76,590 | \$79,788 | \$3,198 |
| Boeing 767-300 | \$87,342 | \$89,784 | \$2,442 |

Connecting Flights



Step 1. Decisions



| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----------------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK - LAX | Regular | 428 | 80 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| | Discount | 190 | 120 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| JFK - DFW | Regular | 642 | 75 | ? | 1 |
| | Discount | 224 | 100 | ? | 1 |
| DFW - LAX | Regular | 512 | 60 | ? | 2 |
| | Discount | 190 | 110 | ? | 2 |

- Number of regular seats to sell
 $\rightarrow R_{\text{JFK-LAX}}, R_{\text{JFK-DFW}}, R_{\text{DFW-LAX}}$
- Number of discount seats to sell
 $\rightarrow D_{\text{JFK-LAX}}, D_{\text{JFK-DFW}}, D_{\text{DFW-LAX}}$

Step 2. Objective

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK | Regular | 428 | 80 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| - | | | | | |
| LAX | Discount | 190 | 120 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| JFK | Regular | 642 | 75 | ? | 1 |
| - | | | | | |
| DFW | Discount | 224 | 100 | ? | 1 |
| DFW | Regular | 512 | 60 | ? | 2 |
| - | | | | | |
| LAX | Discount | 190 | 110 | ? | 2 |

- Maximize total revenue

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned}
 &428R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} + 190D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} \\
 &+ 642R_{\text{JFK-DFW}} + 224D_{\text{JFK-DFW}} \\
 &+ 512R_{\text{DFW-LAX}} + 190D_{\text{DFW-LAX}}
 \end{aligned} \right.$$

Step 3. Constraints

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK | Regular | 428 | 80 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| - | | | | | |
| LAX | Discount | 190 | 120 | ? | 1 & 2 |
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| - | | | | | |
| DFW | Discount | 224 | 100 | ? | 1 |
| DFW | Regular | 512 | 60 | ? | 2 |
| - | | | | | |
| LAX | Discount | 190 | 110 | ? | 2 |

- AA cannot sell more seats than the aircraft capacity

- First leg - JFK-DFW

$$\rightarrow R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} + D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} + R_{\text{JFK-DFW}} + D_{\text{JFK-DFW}} \leq 166$$

- Second leg - DFW-LAX

$$\rightarrow R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} + D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} + R_{\text{DFW-LAX}} + D_{\text{DFW-LAX}} \leq 166$$

Step 3. Constraints

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----------------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK - LAX | Regular | 428 | 80 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| | Discount | 190 | 120 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| JFK - DFW | Regular | 642 | 75 | ? | 1 |
| | Discount | 224 | 100 | ? | 1 |
| DFW - LAX | Regular | 512 | 60 | ? | 2 |
| | Discount | 190 | 110 | ? | 2 |

- AA cannot sell more seats than the demand

$$\left. \begin{aligned}
 R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} &\leq 80 & D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} &\leq 120 \\
 R_{\text{JFK-DFW}} &\leq 75 & D_{\text{JFK-DFW}} &\leq 100 \\
 R_{\text{DFW-LAX}} &\leq 60 & D_{\text{DFW-LAX}} &\leq 110
 \end{aligned} \right\}$$


Step 4. Non-Negativity

| | | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity 166 on each) |
|-----------------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| JFK - LAX | Regular | 428 | 80 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| | Discount | 190 | 120 | ? | 1 & 2 |
| JFK - DFW | Regular | 642 | 75 | ? | 1 |
| | Discount | 224 | 100 | ? | 1 |
| DFW - LAX | Regular | 512 | 60 | ? | 2 |
| | Discount | 190 | 110 | ? | 2 |

- AA cannot sell a negative number of seats

$$\left. \begin{aligned}
 R_{\text{JFK-LAX}} &\geq 0 & D_{\text{JFK-LAX}} &\geq 0 \\
 R_{\text{JFK-DFW}} &\geq 0 & D_{\text{JFK-DFW}} &\geq 0 \\
 R_{\text{DFW-LAX}} &\geq 0 & D_{\text{DFW-LAX}} &\geq 0
 \end{aligned} \right\}$$

Complex Network



Multiple Fare Classes

| Fare | Domestic Upg. | International Upg. | EQP | EQM | Mileage | Fare | Domestic Upg. | International Upg. | EQP | EQM | Mileage |
|----------|------------------|---------------------|-----|-----|---------|----------|---------------------|------------------------------------|-----|-----|---------|
| A | First Class | First Class | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150% | N | Yes | No | .5 | 1.0 | 100% |
| B | Yes | Yes | 1.5 | 1.0 | 100% | O | Yes* | No | .5 | 1.0 | 100% |
| C | NA | Business Upgrade | N/A | N/A | N/A | P | First Class Fare | First Class Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150% |
| D | NA | Business Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125% | Q | Yes | No | .5 | 1.0 | 100% |
| E | No | No | N/A | N/A | N/A | R | NA | Business Class Upgrade or waitlist | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| F | First Class Fare | First Class | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150% | S | Yes* | No | .5 | 1.0 | 100% |
| G | Government | Government | .5 | 1.0 | 100% | T | Coach Award | No | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| H | Yes* | Waitlist only | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100% | U | NA | Business Class Award | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| I | NA | Business Class Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125% | V | Yes* | No | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100% |
| J | NA | Business Class Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125% | W | Yes* | No | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100% |
| K | Yes | No | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100% | X | First Class Upgrade | Business Class Upgrade | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| L | Yes | No | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100% | Y | Yes | Yes | 1.5 | 1.0 | 100% |
| M | Yes | No | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100% | Z | First Class Award | NA | N/A | N/A | N/A |

EQP: Elite-Qualifying Points / EQM: Elite-Qualifying Miles

The Competitive Strategy of AA

- PEOPLExpress could not compete with AA's Ultimate Super Savers fares

“We were a vibrant, profitable company from 1981 to 1985, and then we tipped right over into **losing 50 million a month.**”

“We had been profitable from the day we started until American came at us with Ultimate Super Savers.”

Donald Burr, CEO of PEOPLExpress (1985)

The Competitive Strategy of AA

- Selling the right seats to the right customers at the right prices

“**Revenue management** is the single most important technical development in transportation management since we entered the era of airline deregulation.”

“We estimate that revenue management has generated **\$1.4 billion in incremental revenue** in the last three years.”

Robert Crandall, former CEO of AA (~1985)

The Edge of Revenue Management



- Sabre Holdings
 - Built revenue management system for AA
 - As of November 2012, ranked 133 among America's largest private companies with \$3.15 billion in sales
 - 400 airlines, 90,000 hotels, 30 car-rental companies
- Today, companies prosper from revenue management
 - Delta airlines increased annual revenue by \$300 million
 - Marriott hotels increased annual revenue by \$100 million

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15.071 Analytics Edge
Spring 2017

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